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Abstract: The Recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCDr; Directive 
2013/33/EU) constitutes an improvement with regard to the reception 
conditions that Member States are required to provide for those seeking 
international protection. However, it still envisages the possibility for Member 
States to reduce or withdraw material reception conditions and to grant less 
favourable treatment to international protection applicants compared to 
nationals where it is ‘duly justified’. This may potentially lead Member States 
to grant unacceptably low levels of material reception conditions and could be 
below what is an adequate standard of living as required under the Directive 
itself. Using the lens of the right to human dignity, the article examines selected 
cases of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in order to see how the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) may assist in ensuring that the implementation 
of the RCDr by the Member States provides for adequate and dignified 
standard of living conditions for those seeking international protection. 
Keywords: Reception Conditions Directive; RCD; material reception 
conditions; human dignity; European Convention of Human Rights; ECHR; 
European Court of Human Rights; ECtHR; European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights; EUCFR; Court of Justice of the European Union; CJEU. 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Velluti, S. (xxxx) ‘The 
revised Reception Conditions Directive and adequate and dignified material 
reception conditions for those seeking international protection’, Int. J. 
Migration and Border Studies, Vol. X, No. Y, pp.000–000. 
Biographical notes: Samantha Velluti’s research in the field of asylum focuses 
on developing a human rights approach to the implementation of the Common 
European Asylum System in order to identify ways for enabling international 
protection seekers to exercise and have effective standing to evoke the set of 
rights provided under the ECHR and the EUCFR. Her current research explores 
the role and mutual engagement of national and European Courts in ensuring 
the principled implementation of EU legislative measures and that standards 
and guarantees are met in accordance with International and European human 
rights obligations. 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   2 S. Velluti    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘The Reception 
Conditions Directive and the EUCFR’ presented at the 17th Nordic Migration 
Research Conference ‘Flows, Places and Boundaries – Migratory Challenges 
and New Agendas’, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 13–15 August 2014. 
 
1 Introduction 
Harmonisation of reception conditions within the European Union (EU) is important for 
various reasons. Adequate and dignified reception conditions for asylum-seekers during 
the examination of their application are an essential element of any asylum system 
[ECRE, (2011), p.3]. International protection seekers are inherently vulnerable1 and for 
them it is particularly difficult to fully exercise their rights before any domestic justice 
system as recognised to them by law: ‘statelessness’ not only corresponds to a situation 
of ‘rightlessness’ but also to a life devoid of public appearance and legal personhood 
making it impossible for those excluded from politics to claim the right to have rights 
(Arendt, 1958). The challenge becomes one of identifying a process to help verify the 
existence of and exercise those rights [Velluti, (2015), p.139]. International protection 
seekers are forced to flee their country leaving their family and all of their belongings, 
often becoming destitute and marginalised thus finding themselves in a position of 
complete dependency on the country of asylum. The ultimate question therefore  
is ‘how Europe should recognise that refugees have the right to have rights’  
(Judge de Albuquerque, Concurring Opinion, Hirsi Jamaa 2012). The provision of 
reception conditions raises important questions in relation to the role of the state vis-à-vis 
‘the other’ or better-said the alien. The power of Member States to decide whether, to 
what extent, and under what conditions persons who are not members of a given political 
community or society may, firstly, enter its territory and, secondly, share certain material 
rights brings with it the view that a person is more ‘deserving’ by virtue of his or her 
status as citizen or national than a person who is not. In this context, material rights are 
conceived as membership rights. However, premised on these terms integration equates 
to assimilation and maintains a ‘securitarisation’ paradigm based on a dichotomy 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Velluti, 2013). Moreover, it remains based on a 
Westphalian conception of the state with clearly demarcated borders, the aim being one 
of conformity, discipline and migration control (Kostakopoulou, 2010). The ‘civic 
integration’ paradigm remains a crucial feature of a renewed nation-politics used by 
political elites to provide answers to a wide range of issues and to elicit support for a 
controlling state (Idem). 
Hence, the question becomes a jurisdictional one (Bosniak, 2006): “should the 
regulatory domain of the border with its emphasis on the interest of immigration control 
remain confined to the border, as a result of which asylum seekers are entitled to equal 
treatment with nationals as regards their material rights (the ‘separation model’)? Or does 
the state’s immigration power have some bearing on the normative content of state 
obligations as regards asylum seekers’ material rights under international law (the 
‘convergence model’)?” [Slingenberg, (2014), pp.8–9]. As will be shown, the Reception 
Conditions Directive (RCD) and its recast merge both models depending on the specific 
provisions under scrutiny. 
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Against this background, the article is set to examine how certain provisions of the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) and European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) informed by European and national judicial interpretation can be 
used to ensure a more human rights-based approach to the standards contained in the 
RCD and its recast specifically in relation to material reception arrangements.2 The 
article’s main claim is that judicial interpretation should be premised on the right to 
human dignity. Beyond the emotionally, politically and religiously charged discussions 
that inform any debate about human dignity (McCrudden, 2013) – as well as 
acknowledging at the outset that the latter is context contingent – it is possible to identify 
and apply a legal concept of human dignity, particularly in the European context. 
Specifically, the core constitutional meaning of dignity historically has been and remains 
the definition and protection of humanity [Dupré, (2013b), pp.324–325], which 
“increasingly reflects the state of present political realities: an international community in 
political transition from a system premised on sovereign states toward a more fragmented 
global politics, constrained only by the threshold of preserving ‘humanity’” [Teitel, 
(2004), p.225]. Human dignity can function as a foundation for human rights but also as a 
ground for the critique of certain interpretations of human rights. In the words of 
Advocate General Stix-Hackl “respect for human dignity does […] constitute an integral 
part of the general legal tenets of Community law and a criterion and requirement of the 
legality of acts under Community law” (Case C-36/02, Omega, para. 90). Human dignity 
can therefore address the contemporary challenge of human rights protection against a 
background of changes in the public and private sphere of action and be used as the core 
defining line for setting the parameters of adequate reception conditions for international 
protection seekers in the Member States. 
In the following pages, the most salient aspects of the Recast Reception Conditions 
Directive (RCDr) are presented, with a particular focus on material reception conditions. 
Subsequent sections examine the case law of the European Courts on the right to human 
dignity in light of the ECHR and the EUCFR. The central aim of the paper is to identify 
ways of ensuring a human rights-based approach in Member States’ implementation of 
the revised RCD. The conclusion brings together and reflects on the main findings of the 
paper. 
2 The RCD, its recast3 and material reception conditions 
2.1 The importance of harmonising reception conditions for international 
protection seekers 
Harmonisation of reception conditions prevents or reduces secondary movements of 
international protection seekers. In turn, efficient reception conditions not only ensure an 
adequate standard of living but can also be a conduit for a fair and efficient asylum 
procedure. The importance of harmonising reception conditions was given due 
recognition in the year 2000 when EU guidelines on general principles were adopted 
explicitly envisaging dignifying reception conditions for asylum seekers with comparable 
living standards across the Member States (European Council, 2000). The RCD followed 
shortly. Under this Directive and its recast, Member States have a specific obligation to 
provide applicants for international protection with reception conditions. These 
conditions, read in the light of the fundamental rights and principles found in the ECHR 
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and the EUCFR should be adequate and efficient in order to ensure applicants’ 
subsistence and, more generally, a dignifying life. However, as will be shown, there is 
little evidence suggesting that there has been a significant improvement of standards as a 
consequence of the RCD. Despite the official shift in focus from ‘minimum’ to 
‘common’ standards that the creation and further development of the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) has generated the push for further harmonisation has not 
entailed an abandonment tout cours of flexibility and a margin of appreciation on the part 
of the Member States. By adopting the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States were not willing 
to completely give up their specific concepts of accommodating protection needs 
[Hailbronner, (2008), p.2]. The changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon focusing on 
the adoption of ‘common policies’ (Part Three, Title V, Chapter 2) seem to indicate that 
further legislation in asylum is not limited to ‘minimum standards’. In particular, the 
reference to ‘standards’ as illustrated by the revised RCD, discussed further below, would 
seem to indicate a departure from the lowest common level of all Member States. The use 
of the term ‘more favourable standards’ (e.g. Article 4 RCDr) enables Member States to 
go beyond the general standards established in CEAS. While prima facie it may appear as 
a better clause, this term has been problematic in practice [Hailbronner, (2008), p.4]. In 
the first place, Member States have used this clause to argue that by maintaining more 
favourable national laws no transposition of asylum Directives was needed with the 
unwanted result of having either a partial or full non-transposition of asylum Directive 
provisions (UNHCR, 2010). Linked to this, allowing Member States to maintain 
substantially different ‘higher’ standards potentially undermines CEAS negating its 
harmonisation objective with the result that it does not deter secondary movements. 
2.2 The RCDr 
The revised RCD applies to all international protection applicants including family 
members [Articles 2(1)(b) and 3(1)], with the exception of requests for diplomatic or 
territorial asylum submitted to representations of Member States [Article 3(2)]. Minor 
and dependent adult applicants enjoy more guarantees to be housed jointly with family 
members and relatives [Recital 18(a), Articles 12, 18(2)(a)(c)]. However, Article 2(1)(c) 
Recast requires the family ties to have been established already in the country of origin. 
This fails to accommodate family ties that may have been formed while residing in a 
third country during flight and may prevent refugees from enjoying the right to family 
unity contrary to the 1951 Geneva Convention, which provides protection for the refugee 
family in various articles without explicitly mentioning family unity or reunification.4 
Member States shall inform applicants of their rights and obligations within 15 days after 
they have lodged their application, of at least any established benefits and obligations that 
they must comply with (Article 5). Member States must also ensure that they are 
informed about organisations or groups of persons that provide specific legal assistance 
and organisations that might be able to help or inform them concerning the available 
reception conditions, including healthcare. In addition, Article 17(1) provides that 
“Member States shall ensure that material reception conditions are available to applicants 
when they make their application for international protection”. The RCDr defines 
material reception conditions as reception conditions that include housing, food and 
clothing, provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in vouchers, and a daily expenses 
allowance [Article 2(g)]. 
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Member States have an obligation to ensure access to the labour market no later than 
nine months after the application for international protection is lodged [Article 15(1)]. 
With regard to health care, there is explicit reference to essential treatment of serious 
mental disorders and, where needed, appropriate mental health care (Article 19). 
Significantly, the revised Directive strengthens safeguards for vulnerable groups  
(Articles 21–25) and Member States must guarantee that persons who have been subject 
to torture, rape or other serious acts of violence receive the necessary treatment ensuring 
access to appropriate medical and psychological treatment or care. Furthermore, those 
working with such persons must have had, and must continue to receive, the appropriate 
training and be bound by confidentiality rules (Article 25). 
As to material reception conditions, Article 17(2) provides that “Member States shall 
ensure that material reception conditions provide an adequate standard of living for 
applicants, which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental 
health”. Where Member States provide material reception conditions in the form of 
financial allowances or vouchers, Article 17(5) provides for a system based on reference 
points established by each Member State in law or in practice to ensure adequate 
standards of living comparable with nationals but there is no obligation to provide for 
equality of treatment. Article 17(5) also allows Member States to grant less favourable 
reception treatment ‘where it is duly justified’ in situations where there is a housing 
shortage or where necessary to determine a vulnerable applicant’s particular needs 
[Article 18(9)]. This may potentially lead Member States to grant unacceptably low 
levels of material reception conditions as the extent to which treatment may be less 
favourable compared to nationals is not qualified. There is a risk that treatment could be 
well below what is an adequate standard of living necessary to guarantee their 
subsistence and protect their physical and mental health as required under Article 17(2). 
More generally, it may be contrary to the aim of the Directive, which lays down 
standards for the reception of applicants that are sufficient to ensure them a dignified 
standard of living (Recital 11) and respect for the fundamental rights recognised by the 
EUCFR, including the full respect for human dignity (Recital 35). 
It is regrettable that the revised Directive affords such flexibility and margin of 
appreciation to the Member States considering that a comparative study of the 
implementation of the original RCD shows that the provision of national reception 
support in many Member States is insufficient and is often supplemented or even 
replaced by assistance provided by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Odysseus, 
2007). A recent study [ECRE, (2015), pp.20–33] not only confirms the significant 
difference between Member States’ reception conditions but also shows how “a lengthy 
asylum procedure and insufficient reception capacity in many Member States results in a 
failure to provide a dignified standard of living” [ECRE, (2015), p.22]. In spite of this 
evidence the RCDr still affords Member States with a fairly high degree of discretion and 
flexibility. Article 7(3) provides that Member States may make provision of the material 
reception conditions subject to actual residence by the applicants in a specific place, to be 
determined by the Member States. In addition, Member States may make the provision of 
some, or all of the material reception conditions and health care, subject to the condition 
that applicants do not have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate for 
their health and to enable their subsistence [Article 17(3)]. They can also require 
applicants to cover or contribute to the cost of the material reception conditions and 
healthcare if they have sufficient resources [Article 17(4)]. 
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Article 18 states that when housing is provided it should take one or a combination of 
one of the following forms: 
a premises for the purposes of housing applicants during the examination of an 
application for asylum lodged at a border or in transit zones 
b accommodation centres that guarantee an adequate standard of living 
c private houses, flats, hotels or other premises adapted for housing applicants. 
Member States must also ensure the protection of applicants’ family life, their gender, 
age-specific concerns and the situation of vulnerable persons and give applicants the 
possibility to communicate with relatives, legal advisers or counsellors, persons 
representing UNHCR and other relevant national, international and NGOs and bodies and 
to grant them access to the premises of the applicants [Article 18(2)–(3)]. In addition, the 
revised Directive provides that dependent adults with special reception needs are 
accommodated together with close adult relatives who are already present in the same 
Member State and who are responsible for them [Article 18(5)]. A further safeguard 
concerns the transfer of applicants from one housing facility to another, which should 
only take place when necessary and applicants will be able to inform their legal advisers 
or counsellors of the transfer and new address [Article 18(6)]. 
With regard to the possibility of Member States’ reducing material reception 
conditions, Member States retain a wide margin of discretion. Material reception 
conditions can be reduced when an applicant abandons a place of residence without 
informing them or without permission, when the applicant does not comply with 
reporting duties, or when they lodge a subsequent application [Article 20(1)a–c]. The 
RCDr has improved the safeguards for withdrawing material reception conditions5 as 
Member States can only withdraw them in exceptional and duly justified cases  
[Article 20(1)] with the exception of when financial resources are concealed  
[Article 20(3)]. In addition, decisions for reduction or withdrawal of material reception 
conditions shall be taken individually, objectively and impartially and reasons must be 
given, taking into account the principle of proportionality [Article 20(5)]. When material 
reception conditions are reduced or withdrawn Member States must still ensure access to 
healthcare and ensure a dignified standard of living for all applicants [Article 20(5)]. 
Recital 35 explicitly refers to full respect for human dignity. Nevertheless, the possibility 
that the withdrawal or reduction of reception conditions might be below an adequate 
standard of living is not consistent with the requirements of European human rights law 
and arguably even in its revised form the RCD does not adequately reflect established 
case law under Article 3 ECHR. The possibility for Member States to completely 
withdraw reception conditions should only be allowed where it is shown that the 
applicant concerned has sufficient means of support ensuring an adequate standard of 
living. 
Overall, the above analysis indicates that even in its revised form the RCD has not 
achieved a full harmonisation of reception conditions. Hence, we can see how states’ 
immigration control power has some bearing on the normative content of states’ 
obligations regarding asylum seekers material rights under International law. In turn, this 
further illustrates how it is not possible to maintain a clear distinction between a 
‘separation model’ and a ‘convergence model’ (see above, Section 1). 
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A way to adequately address the limitations of the RCD (including its recast) and its 
problematic application is through the judicial intervention and further mutual 
engagement of both national and European Courts which have a key monitoring function 
to ensure that standards and guarantees are met. Courts may play an important part in 
ensuring the principled implementation of the revised RCD by the Member States and, in 
particular, compliance with International and European human rights obligations. The 
next section examines the case-law of the European Courts in relation to the right to 
human dignity and its application to reception conditions. 
3 The jurisprudence of the European Courts 
3.1 Reception conditions that guarantee adequate standards of living for 
international protection seekers 
As stated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2009) “poor 
material reception conditions coupled with lack of employment opportunities during the 
asylum procedure can lead to a vicious circle of isolation, discrimination and poor 
integration prospects. This can have a negative impact on asylum seekers’ physical and 
psychological health, leaving them demoralized after recognition as refugees, or 
unprepared to return if their applications are rejected”. Moreover, disparity between 
reception arrangements in the EU makes certain Member States more attractive than 
others increasing secondary migratory movements of asylum-seekers (Directive 
2003/9/EC, Preamble, Recital 8). Secondary movements can be explained by a series of 
factors such as language, recognition rates and geography. While the actual influence of 
reception conditions on the choice of those seeking international protection is difficult to 
evaluate, the quality of reception conditions will arguably have an impact, in particular, 
“where the applicant is left waiting to access an asylum procedure in unfavourable 
circumstances” [O’Nions, (2014), p.134]. 
The foregoing raises the question of what is meant by ‘adequate standard of living’. 
Article 31 of the European Social Charter provides for the right to housing which 
includes access to housing of an adequate standard; the prevention, reduction and gradual 
elimination of homelessness and accessible price of housing to those without adequate 
resources. Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) provides that everyone has the right to “an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions”. Further guidance can be found in  
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which states that: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event 
of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood 
are entitled to special care and assistance. All Children, whether born in or out 
of wedlock shall enjoy the same social protection.” 
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From the above, we can see that the notion of ‘adequate standard of living’ encompasses 
the guarantee of basic rights concerning an individual’s mental and physical health, 
subsistence and general well-being. 
3.2 The case law of the ECtHR and the right to human dignity 
3.2.1 A commitment to the protection of human dignity 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has made its commitment to protecting 
human dignity explicit since the 1990s. In SW v UK (Application No. 20166/92) the 
Court referred to the respect for human dignity and human freedom as the very essence of 
the fundamental objectives of the Convention (para. 44), which was re-stated in Pretty v 
UK where the ECtHR spoke about dignity in relation to Article 8 ECHR and the notion of 
quality of life (para. 65). The Court has also associated the right to human dignity with 
the concept of personal autonomy and the personal sphere of each individual (I v UK, 
Application No. 25680/94, para. 70). At the same time, the ECtHR also found that Article 
8 ECHR cannot be interpreted as obliging a state to provide everyone with a home, 
(Chapman v UK, Application No. 27238/95) and that it does not provide for a general 
obligation to give refugees financial assistance in order for them to maintain a certain 
standard of living (Muslim v Turkey, Application No. 53566/99). 
Significantly, in Kurić the Court referred to the Arendtian notion of the lack of legal 
personhood in relation to a country’s refusal to grant citizenship making the applicants 
stateless and held that it constituted a ‘serious encroachment on human dignity’ (Kurić 
and Others v. Slovenia, Application No. 26828/06, para. 319). A similar situation occurs 
when an international protection seeker is unable to register an application for no fault of 
their own and leaving them in a situation where they do not have rights or any 
entitlements [ECRE, (2015), p.17]. By the same token, when the actual receipt of 
material reception conditions for international protection seekers is tied to the issuance of 
a residence card, delays in issuing the card – where the delay is caused by a given 
national administration – can raise questions vis-à-vis the principle of good 
administration [ECRE, (2015), pp.21–22]. 
3.2.2 The application of Article 3 ECHR to domestic reception conditions 
When considering Article 3 ECHR cases, the ECtHR has consistently held that the lack 
of resources of a state cannot normally justify the failure to fulfil their obligations  
under the Convention. This has been particularly the case in relation to detention 
conditions (e.g. Poltoratskiy v Ukraine, Application No. 38812/97; Nazarenko v Ukraine, 
Application No. 39483/98). Under Article 3 ECHR detention conditions have to be 
compatible with the respect of human dignity (Orchowski v Poland, Application No. 
17885/04; Peers v Greece, Application No. 28524/95; Rahimi v Greece, Application No. 
8687/08). In another series of cases concerning the provision of social welfare services by 
the state, the Court found that its insufficient provision particularly in cases of complete 
dependency on state support may be incompatible with human dignity (Budina v Russia, 
Application No. 45603/05 and Larioshina v Russia, Application No. 56869/00, even 
though the latter was declared inadmissible). 
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A parallelism can be drawn with the obligation that Member States have under the 
RCD and its recast to provide adequate reception conditions. The reasoning in the above 
judgments would seem to indicate that insufficient reception conditions would not ensure 
an adequate quality of life for international protection seekers and could be incompatible 
therefore with the right to dignity and thus Article 3 ECHR. Indeed, in M.S.S. v Greece 
and Belgium (Application No. 30696/09) the ECtHR found both Belgium and Greece in 
violation of Article 3 ECHR due to the extremely poor conditions that the applicant was 
subject to while living in Greece where he did not receive any subsistence or 
accommodation from the state. Belgium was found to be in breach of Article 3 ECHR as 
the authorities sent the applicant back to Greece (under the Dublin Regulation) where 
there was a real risk that he would face treatment that would be contrary to Article 3 
ECHR. The ECtHR held that the fact that an asylum-seeker had spent months living in a 
state of extreme poverty, unable to cater for his most basic needs in combination with 
prolonged uncertainty and the total lack of any prospects of his situation improving 
amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR. 
In M.S.S., the Court used EU asylum standards to find a lack of protection that went 
beyond the traditional Conventional rights [Ippolito and Velluti, (2014), p.178]. In 
particular, the ECtHR found that there is a positive obligation on Member States 
stemming from the RCD to provide asylum seekers with accommodation and decent 
material conditions and it used the ‘particularly serious’ deprivation of material reception 
conditions to extend the notion of inhuman and degrading treatment to the extremely 
poor living conditions of destitute asylum seekers (M.S.S, para. 250). Hence, failure by 
Greece to comply with the RCD was used by the Court as an “aggravating factor that 
compounded the systemic frustration of M.S.S’.s needs and increased his sense of lack of 
redress” [Clayton, (2011), p.768]. 
In Tarakel v Switzerland (Application No. 29217/12) – a case concerning a Dublin 
transfer – the ECtHR noted that asylum seekers were an ‘underprivileged and vulnerable 
group’, and it was possible that extreme poverty could raise issues under Article 3 ECHR 
(para. 118). The Court also referred to prior case law on the need to ensure that child 
asylum-seekers, who were in a position of ‘extreme vulnerability’, enjoyed ‘protection 
and humanitarian assistance’ (para. 99). While the Court distinguished the situation in 
Italy from that of Greece (and consequently that this was a different case from that of 
M.S.S.), it found that there were a number of problems in relation to the reception 
conditions within certain facilities (para. 120). The Swiss authorities therefore could not 
send an Afghan family back to Italy under the Dublin Regulation without having first 
obtained individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the applicants would be 
taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would 
be kept together (para. 122). 
From the above, we may argue that the right to human dignity requires that the 
quality of life of an applicant for international protection must be one that is of a 
sufficient standard and specifically one that respects the intrinsic worth of mankind. What 
this means is that in cases where national authorities are dealing with a particularly 
vulnerable group such as asylum seekers minimum reception conditions, namely, food, 
clothes, bedding and access to sanitary conditions, need to be provided to meet the 
standard under Article 3 ECHR. 
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3.3 The case law of the CJEU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
towards more harmonised and dignified standards of living? 
3.3.1 The significance of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights for a human 
rights-based implementation of the RCD 
The Charter has improved the centrality and weight of fundamental rights, reinforcing 
both their visibility in the legal discourse of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and their role as parameters of constitutionality [Iglesias Sánchez, (2012), 
p.1576]. 
Its scope of application is not limited to Union citizens but also extends to  
third-country nationals (TCNs). Notably, the right to human dignity is applicable to all 
persons, regardless of their nationality or status within the Union. Its primacy is 
recognised in Article 1 EUCFR which states that human dignity is inviolable and it must 
be respected and protected and Article 2 TEU where human dignity is included as one of 
the values on which the Union is founded. In addition, Chapter 1 of the EU Charter 
provides the normative features of human dignity in a cluster of key prohibitions, which 
emphasise its legal significance in the EU framework of fundamental rights. This is in 
stark contrast with the ECHR where we find no equivalent. The first and only express 
reference to human dignity is in Protocol 13 concerning the abolition of the death 
penalty. However, in Pretty the ECtHR found that “the very essence of the Convention is 
respect for human dignity and freedom” (Pretty v United Kingdom, Application No. 
2346/02, 29 July 2002, para 65; see also SW v United Kingdom, Application No. 
20166/92, 22 November 1995). 
As a constitutional foundation of any legal system based on the rule of law human 
dignity is a response to times of inhumanity and it carries the hope that the regime created 
by a given constitution (which is based in dignity) will foster a democracy (comprising 
the setting up of appropriate human rights and institutional design) in which human 
beings can lead a meaningful life and shape their personal and political destiny [Dupré, 
(2013b), pp.324–325; Dupré, 2013a]. Hence, the right to human dignity encompasses a 
negative obligation on Member States not to interfere with an individual’s right to human 
dignity, but it also imposes a positive obligation on Member States to ensure that an 
applicant’s right to dignity not be breached. 
How do we define human dignity legally? The content of the right to human dignity 
has not been explicitly defined by the ECtHR or the CJEU. However, it is possible to 
identify a ‘core’ meaning of human dignity by looking at some of the first International 
human rights instruments following the end of World War II. The Preamble to the 
Charter of the United Nations (UN, 1945) reaffirms the people’s faith “in the dignity and 
worth of the human person”. Hence, as maintained by McCrudden (2008, p.679), the 
minimum content of human dignity consists in the fact that every human possesses an 
innate worth, just by being human, which needs to be respected and recognised. The 
Preambles to the 1948 UDHR and both the 1966 UN Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the ICESCR recognise the inherent dignity and the equal and 
inalienable rights of all human beings as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world and as forming the basis for these rights. Article 1 UDHR refers to all human 
beings as born free and equal in dignity and rights and other provisions of the UDHR 
refer to the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights as indispensable for the 
dignity and free development of the personality of human beings (Article 22) and to the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The revised RCD and adequate and dignified material reception conditions 11    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
right to just remuneration to ensure an existence worthy of human dignity (Article 23). 
Essentially, these provisions rest on the idea of self-determination and freedom of 
mankind. A similar line of reasoning can be found in the Opinion of Advocate General 
Stix-Hackl in the Omega case where she attempts to elaborate a legal concept of human 
dignity in the EU framework (Case C-36/02, Opinion, paras. 74–94). According to the 
Advocate General “human dignity is an expression of the respect and value to be 
attributed to each human being on account of his or her humanity. It concerns the 
protection of and respect for the essence or nature of the human being per se – that is to 
say the ‘substance’ of mankind” (Case C-36/02, Opinion, para. 75). Human dignity 
“reflects the idea that every human being is considered to be endowed with certain 
inherent or inalienable rights” (Case C-36/02, Opinion, para. 77), and because of “his 
ability to forge his own free will he is a person (subject) and must not be downgraded to a 
thing or object” (Case C-36/02, Opinion, para. 78). In this context, dignity is considered 
in its negative connotation as ‘indignity’ illustrating how the lack of dignity should also 
be understood in terms of humiliation (Margalit, 2011). Such conceptualisation of dignity 
may be helpful to show the degree of humiliation that international protection seekers are 
subject to in a given host society. 
As mentioned earlier, the significance of the Charter’s provisions as an ‘EU’ human 
rights instrument is that only a few are limited to Union citizens, which are mainly to be 
found in Chapter 5 of the Charter. However, even in this chapter, there are fundamental 
rights to which any person is entitled. Article 41 EUCFR contains a right to good 
administration (or due diligence), providing that: “Every person has the right to have his 
or her affairs handed impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions 
and bodies of the Union”. When referring to the institutions and bodies of the Union, it 
also includes national authorities when they are implementing EU law [as per  
Article 51(1) EUCFR] and, specifically, when the matter falls within the scope of EU law 
(Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10; Texdata, Case C-418/11). The CJEU considered 
this issue also in the context of Dublin transfers (NS and ME, Joined Cases C-411/10 and 
C-493/10) where it found that the sovereignty clause in Article 3(2) of the Dublin 
Regulation (Regulation No. 343/2003) “forms part of the mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for an asylum application provided for under that regulation 
and, therefore, merely an element of the CEAS. Thus, a Member State which exercises 
that discretionary power must be considered as implementing European Union law within 
the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter”. However, the problem with Article 41 
EUCFR is that, by contrast to Article 51(1) EUCFR, there is no explicit reference to 
national authorities implementing EU law, which was highlighted by the CJEU in Cicala 
(Case C-482/10). The limited scope of Article 41 EUCFR has been addressed by 
Advocate General Kokott in Mellor (Case C-75/08) for whom, independently of the 
limitation in Article 41 EUCFR, Member States may not be completely free when 
enacting procedural rules with a view to the application of Union law and that Article 41 
EUCFR “contains rules of good administration by the institutions, but documents a 
general principle of law, which authorities of the Member States too must observe when 
applying Community law” (Opinion of AG Kokott, paras. 27, 33–34). As a general 
principle of EU law and in spite of the wording of Article 41 EUCFR, the right to good 
administration thus requires that Member States have certain administrative standards in 
place for their implementation of EU law, although this may vary between Member 
States. 
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Following this line of thinking, it could be argued that international protection seekers 
could rely on Article 41 EUCFR for requesting that his or her claim be dealt with an 
impartial and fair manner and within a reasonable period of time. This argument is 
buttressed by the fact that asylum law and policy is now clearly within the remit of EU 
law (Article 78 TFEU). Moreover, as the right to good administration constitutes a 
general principle of EU law Member States need to abide by it when adopting decisions 
that fall within the scope of EU law. This principle also covers instances whereby  
non-compliance of one party to the proceedings arises from the behaviour of the 
administration itself. The right to due diligence therefore protected in Article 41 EUCFR 
is particularly important in the context of the reduction or withdrawal of material 
reception conditions. 
Another right which is essential to decisions concerning the reduction or withdrawal 
of material reception conditions is the right to be heard as per Article 41(2) EUCFR. In 
Dokter (Case C-28/05) the Court held that the addressees of decisions which significantly 
affect their interests should be placed in a position in which they may effectively make 
known their views on the evidence on which the contested decision is based. In MM 
(Case C-277/11) the CJEU held that the right to good administration includes the right of 
every person to be heard and restated that the latter is of particular salience before any 
individual measure which can potentially affect him or her adversely is taken (para. 85). 
Specifically, it held that the right to be heard is a fundamental principle of EU law and 
that Article 41(2) EUCFR is of general application (paras. 82 and 84). In particular, 
“according to its case law, Member States must not only interpret their national law in a 
manner consistent with EU law but also make sure they do not rely on an interpretation 
which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order or 
with the other general principles of EU law” (para. 93), including the right to be heard. 
Consequently, according to the CJEU an asylum applicant must be heard by the national 
authorities responsible for determining the claim of international protection pursuant to 
the rules of the CEAS (para. 89). This case seems to indicate that the Court is willing to 
apply Article 41 EUCFR to national authorities. However, this is not set in stone. In 
Mukarubega (Case C-166/13) and Buodjlida (Case C-249/13) on the Return Directive 
(Directive 2008/115/EC) the CJEU held that the right to be heard only applies to the 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU and not to national bodies. According 
to Basilien-Gainche (2014), “the CJEU restricts the extent and the content of the right to 
be heard for TCNs facing removal orders, so much so that this supposedly fundamental 
right appears to be nonexistent”. 
International protection seekers may also be able to rely on Article 47 EUCFR, which 
provides for the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (e.g. Case C-175/08, 
Abdulla, where there is explicit reference to the respect of the rights protected in the 
EUCFR). In this respect the CJEU has found that when national rules make it impossible 
or excessively difficult to protect rights they should be set aside as they would constitute 
a breach of the principle of effectiveness (Case 199/82, San Giorgio). 
3.3.2 The Saciri judgment: an application of dignified standards of living to 
material reception conditions 
Article 4 EUCFR is the EU equivalent of Article 3 ECHR and the line of reasoning of the 
ECtHR in relation to Article 3 ECHR can also be applied to Article 4 EUCFR.6 
Accordingly, if Member States provide material reception conditions that are insufficient 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The revised RCD and adequate and dignified material reception conditions 13    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
thus exposing the applicant to a real risk of poverty, it could potentially raise an issue 
under Article 4 EUCFR. 
We have seen that under International and European human rights law the realisation 
of economic, social and cultural rights is indispensable for the dignity and free 
development of human beings. In this regard, the RCDr provides that Member States 
must ensure that material reception conditions guarantee adequate standards of living for 
applicants, namely, their subsistence and physical and mental health [Article 17(2)]. This 
notwithstanding, the revised Directive also affords a significant amount of flexibility and 
margin of appreciation to the Member States allowing less favourable treatment 
compared to nationals ‘where duly justified’. In addition, it envisages the possibility that 
the reduction or withdrawal of material reception conditions might be below an adequate 
standard of living. Given this embedded ambivalence of the RCDr, the role of the CJEU 
becomes clearly pivotal: firstly, in ensuring adequate standards of material reception 
conditions and, more generally, in reducing the gap between a ‘securitisation’ and a 
human rights-based approach. 
The key case concerning the provision of material reception conditions and dignified 
standards of living is Saciri (Case C-79/13), which provides a good insight into the 
complexity and nature of the problems concerning material reception conditions at 
national level. This case was about a family that applied for asylum in Belgium and for 
accommodation to the Belgian agency for asylum seeker reception (Fedasil). Fedasil 
informed the Saciri family that it did not have any available accommodation and referred 
it to obtain a financial allowance from the Belgian public centre for social welfare 
(OCMW). OCMW refused to provide the family with a financial allowance on the 
grounds that the family was not staying at Fedasil’s asylum reception centre. 
Consequently, the family was denied both public asylum seeker accommodation and a 
financial allowance to rent in the private market. So essentially, the case concerned 
minimum standards for ensuring the right to family housing for destitute asylum seekers. 
The CJEU was asked to examine what level of support a Member State should 
provide when they opt to provide material support in the form of a financial allowance as 
per Article 13(5) RCD. In particular, the questions concerned whether a Member State 
that chooses to provide a financial allowance instead of accommodation is bound by the 
requirements of Articles 13 and 14 RCD and, in particular, whether the financial 
allowance should be sufficient to allow an asylum seeker to provide their own 
accommodation at all times. Another important question concerned the time of payment 
of the financial allowance and whether the positive obligation stemming from the 
Directive also arises in situations of full asylum accommodation and when a Member 
State refers asylum seekers to other public agencies. 
The CJEU held that the Directive’s purpose and general scheme, together with the 
observance of fundamental rights, is to prevent the asylum seeker from being deprived of 
the protection of the minimum standards as provided in the Directive itself. The material 
reception conditions therefore must be available to the asylum seeker from the day he 
makes the application for asylum, as provided also by Article 13(1) RCD (para. 34). The 
Court confirmed its judgment in Cimade and Gisti (Case C-179/11) where it held that 
Member States are obliged to grant the minimum conditions for the reception of asylum-
seekers, even to those in respect of whom it decides to call upon another Member State as 
responsible for examining their application for asylum to take charge of or to take back 
those applicants (paras. 33 and 35; see further UNHCR, 2013). In that same case, 
Advocate General Sharpston explicitly referred to human dignity and the importance of 
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respecting and protecting it. She also said that failure to ensure social assistance available 
to applicants and, more generally, the lack of reception conditions may risk undermining 
the effectiveness of the right to asylum as per Article 18 EUCFR (Opinion, Case  
C-179/11, paras. 55–56). In a similar vein, the Court held that the right to human dignity 
must be respected and protected (para. 42). Asylum seekers therefore may not be 
deprived, even for a temporary period of time, of the protection of the minimum 
standards laid down by that Directive (para. 56). 
As to the amount of the financial allowance granted by a Member State that opted for 
this form of material reception conditions, the amount of aid granted must be sufficient to 
ensure a standard of living, which is adequate for the health of the applicants and capable 
of ensuring their subsistence (para. 40). However, in combination with Recital 7 in the 
Preamble of the Directive, those allowances must be also sufficient to ensure a dignified 
standard of living by enabling them to obtain housing, if necessary, even on the private 
rental market (paras. 39 and 42). In particular, this means that in the case of persons 
having special needs, such as minors, the amount must be sufficient to assure them to be 
housed with their parents in order to maintain the family unity (paras. 41 and 45). At the 
same time, the CJEU held that asylum seekers cannot make their own choice of housing 
suitable for themselves (para. 43). Hence, Member States maintain some margin of 
discretion. 
The CJEU also held that since Member States may grant material reception 
conditions in the form of financial allowances if they cannot grant them in kind, they may 
refer an asylum seeker to bodies within the general public assistance system if they 
cannot provide for housing (para. 49). If a Member State decides to use as intermediaries 
the bodies which are part of the general public assistance system, they have to ensure that 
the minimum standards laid down in the Directive for asylum seekers are respected  
(para. 49). Significantly, the Court held that saturation of the reception networks cannot 
be used as a justification for not meeting the minimum standards set out in the RCD 
(para. 50). In practice this means that Member States will not be able to escape their 
obligations under the RCD and its recast even in circumstances where asylum seeker 
accommodation is full. This is particularly important in light of the fact that in most 
Member States protection seeker accommodation is insufficient and overcrowded 
[ECRE, (2015), pp.22–27]. Another important aspect of the judgment concerns  
Article 14(3) RCD, which requires that minors should be housed with their parents. The 
Court found that even though it does not apply to the financial allowance, the latter 
should nevertheless enable minors to live with their parents (para. 45). This constitutes 
not only a recognition of the importance of family unity but also of dignifying living 
standards. Hence, in contrast with the ECtHR (cfr. Chapman v UK and also Muslim v 
Turkey, in Section 3) the CJEU seems to adopt a much stronger human rights-based 
approach to the national provision of certain material reception conditions, particularly 
when the case concerns vulnerable persons such as destitute asylum seekers, minors and 
the unity of the family. 
Overall, the Saciri judgment represents an important step forward in helping to give 
concrete meaning and ensure adequate and dignified standards of living for those seeking 
international protection in the EU context. 
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5 Conclusions: giving with one hand and taking with the other 
The preceding analysis provides a mixed picture of the RCD and its recast: on the one 
hand, some of the provisions have improved the quality of material reception conditions 
in the Member States. On the other hand, Member States still retain a significant margin 
of discretion. Differences between Member States remain because the RCD and its recast 
maintain this state of affairs. Specifically, the provisions on material reception conditions 
continue to be open to wide interpretation and Member States may grant less favourable 
treatment to international protection seekers compared to nationals where some of the 
support is provided in kind or where national standards of living are higher than what is 
prescribed for international protection seekers under the RCD. Overall, the changes 
introduced by the Recast Directive are insufficient to guarantee an adequate and dignified 
standard of living for international protection seekers. This limited ‘success’ of the 
Directive is explained by the persistence of ‘securitarisation’ and ‘civic integration’ 
paradigms, which maintain and exacerbate the distinction between those who are 
members of a given political community and those who are not members. Consequently, 
there is still a strong tension between a migration control rational and one premised on 
the protection of human rights; a tension which ‘seeps out of the pores’7 of the Directive. 
Both national and European Courts retain a key monitoring role in ensuring that 
standards and guarantees are met. Where courts take into account the legal reasoning of 
other courts they might engage in a process of practical reasoning which may gradually 
help to define adequate and dignified reception conditions for international protection 
seekers with comparable living standards across the Member States. In particular, courts 
may play an important part in ensuring the principled implementation of the revised RCD 
by the Member States, namely, compliance with International and European human rights 
obligations. 
The article argued throughout that judicial interpretation should be premised on the 
right to human dignity. Human dignity can have both a foundational function for other 
fundamental rights and also act as a ground for critiquing certain interpretations of human 
rights. It can therefore address the contemporary challenge of human rights protection 
against a background of changes in the public and private sphere of action and be used as 
the core defining line for setting the parameters of adequate reception conditions for 
international protection seekers in the Member States. 
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Notes 
1 Article 21 of the RCDr provides for a non-exhaustive list of those who should be considered 
vulnerable according to specific factors or circumstances; cfr with Article 2(k) where the 
definition of which categories of applicants are particularly vulnerable remains unspecified; on 
the notion of vulnerability in the EU, see Brandl and Czech (2015); on vulnerability and 
ECHR law, see Peroni and Timmer (2013). 
2 For detailed analysis of Member States’ obligations stemming from international refugee law, 
international social security law and international human rights law in relation to their 
reception arrangements for asylum seekers, see Slingenberg (2014). 
3 The recast Reception Conditions Directive entered into force in July 2013 and the deadline for 
transposition is July 2015. 
4 E.g. Article 4 refers to refugees’ “freedom as regards the religious education of their children”; 
Article 12(2) provides that “[…] rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected […]”;  
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